

## **US Security Assistance to Pakistan in Post 9/11 Period**

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This paper attempts to understand the dynamics of United States aid assistance to Pakistan in the light of post 9/11 security developments in the world. The analysis of US foreign policy aid instruments generally indicates three broad objectives: strategic/politico-security benefits, economic interests and humanitarian concerns. Although one consistently recurring theme in US foreign policy aid provision, both in the Cold War period and the newer post 2001 ‘War on Terror’ period has been security. This theme has also defined US-Pakistan aid relationship in different times, with the exception of Bush administration, who unlike the Cold War period made an alteration by specifying funds for purpose-based usage in sub-fields. This paper argues that Bush administration sought to achieve US foreign policy objectives by providing strategic aid to Pakistan much at the expense of domestic public opinion. It further stresses that change in administration in the US brought obstacles in aid flows to Pakistan as President Obama not only reduced the amount of aid under specific heads, but also openly accused Pakistan of fomenting the militants (the good Taliban), which in turn hurt the US broader strategic goals in the region and raised irreconcilable issues of trust between the two countries. The new administration of Trump went a step ahead by suspending many of the aid programmes to Pakistan, bringing the all-time trust-deficit between the two countries to an all-time low. This paper primarily applies the realist and neo-realist theoretical framework to understand the aid and security relationship paradigm between the US and Pakistan.

**Keywords:** Military assistance, foreign policy, economic aid, US Pakistan relationship

*“Foreign assistance is an essential component of our transformational diplomacy... to empower developing countries to strengthen security, to consolidate democracy, to increase trade and investment, and to improve the lives of their people...and to prevent the future of the failed states like*

*Afghanistan.*”-Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speech to the State Department (Bureau of Public Affairs, 2006)

Of the various unveiling apparatuses that modern states have used as instruments of foreign policy and fighting wars, one that has produced contestation, aggression and conversely active support is military assistance. Foreign aid has long been considered as an instrument of influence. Use of military assistance as a trenchant ingredient of policy has been abandoned by the modern states except United States, who has been using it as legitimate and budgeted strategy. Nevertheless, in times of war military assistance is considered to be a legal and feasible choice. In post-Cold War politics, to generate their support, the donor states may create recipients who are eager to enter into such kinds of relationship (Mott, 1999).

Generally, “forgiven loans” and exclusive certification of arm sale are presented as an explanation for and objurgating military assistance. Policy planners often find excuses and cautiously pick cases of military assistance to justify their own policy decisions. On the other side, theorists view it in broader spectrum and include it in foreign aid.

The US uses aid as an instrument in forming and promoting joint security matters with its allies (Carol 2008). During Cold War, aid has its specific use in winning allies and buying support against communism (Lundborg 1998). Studies related to foreign aid suggest that the termination of Cold War turn the motive of aid towards humanitarian and developmental one, (Carol 2008) but the beginning of War on Terror harked back the Cold War doctrine of using aid to buy support (Fleck & Kilby 2010).

After the incident of 9/11, Bush administration brought a revolution in the US aid policy. This transformation include change in the motive of aid, its policies and quantity and mechanism to be added in US foreign policy (Fleck & Kilby 2010). Different aid programs were formulated to achieve specific objectives; in totality the purpose of aid is to expand US sphere of influence.

If we compare the aid flow of Cold War with that of War on Terror, it is very much clear that, the goal of aid is to generate support for US led global order and War on Terror. Nevertheless, the amount of aid has been increased substantially going towards the project that benefit the US in its post 9/11 security requirement (Woods 2005). Evidently, donor interests affect the bilateral aid. The large amount of aid in War on Terror have included funds specified for strategically significant partners like Pakistan (Fleck & Kilby

## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

2010). Keeping in view these strategically significant partners most of the alterations in aid allocation have been made during War on Terror (Moss, Roodman, & Standley 2005). There are other objectives of aid like US has proven the commitment to wipe out polio, reduce small pox and promote democratic values. Yet the opinion of elites prevails in the discourses of foreign policy (Picard & Buss 2009). In the elites' viewpoint, security concerns have dominated the post 9/11 scenario and foreign aid policy reverted to meet US security requirements. To Bob Woodward, US foreign aid policy has still humanitarian and economic reasons. It was Bush administration policy that completely ignored the previous goals of aid like humanitarian and spread of American values i.e. democracy (Woodward 2006).

### Objectives of US Aid After Cold War



Foreign Policy Objectives  
During WoT



Security Aid

Bush administration to pursue its security policy in the region once again catapulted Pakistan to an indispensable ally status in the regional security set-up. Consequently, Pakistan revisited its security policy and became a frontline state in the US led War on Terror. For realization of her interests in the region, the US again realizing the need for an old partner, waived the sanctions imposed on Pakistan during the 1990s. To enhance Pakistan's potential to take actions against the militants, the United States provided Pakistan military

assistance through various funds. This paper focuses on post 9/11 Pak-US security relations through the lens of US security policy in post 9/11. It focuses predominantly on the nature of US security assistance to Pakistan in post 9/11 period and the related dynamism associated with it. For exploring this facet of Pak-US relations, the paper is divided into five parts. The first part introduces the subject under consideration. The second part is based on discourses on military assistance and its relevance in contemporary world. The third part describes the US security assistance provided through three different funds, carried off by Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The fourth part of this paper analyzes Pak-US security assistance program, provided through Coalition Support Fund and related funds. The fifth and last part of this paper conclude the whole discussion.

### **Military Assistance in Retrospect**

Military assistance is not a new phenomenon; it is as old as global politics. It has been used across the world in different forms as an instrument of foreign policy since the very early times. In some cases, it is used by the donor for promotion of its interest as the core principle of foreign policy; while in other cases, it is used as a core principle by the recipients. In the contemporary world, the phenomenon evolved in the concept of mercenary soldiers employed by feudal lords e.g., England Coalition Wars against France. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the phenomenon was embedded in navy when Europeans armed and paid crews of foreign ships to intimidate their rivals. The idea of military assistance came to loom again as diplomatic and strategic instrument when the United States started Lend-Lease program of World War II. By means of such schemes, the United States used military assistance as additive to ameliorate allied military endeavors (Mott, 1999).

Soon after the war, the United States used military and economic aid as the prime instrument of its foreign policy during peace time to restore world order. Aid programs launched by the United States and the Soviet Union enhance the scope of military assistance when it was extended to the developing states in 1954 and was perceived more than just an instrument to strengthen the military potentials of the recipient nations. The United States expected that the military assistance it provided to the recipient would serve as a substitute of American forces to contain the Communist influence. The stipulated objectives that the US military assistance could serve came to an end after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The United States deemed military assistance as instrument of foreign policy to create foreign forces to act as the US proxies which can operate at every stage with the exception of nuclear war (Mott, 1999).

## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Over a period of time, governments have allocated huge amounts of money and enormous possessions to military assistance as distinct element of foreign policy.

### **Military Assistance: A Theoretical Perspective**

From realist perspective many powerful nations of the world are providing military assistance to a number of countries despite wrangling, propaganda and outrages. Analytical ideas emerged while focusing only the happenings of the Cold War and witnessed the US involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet involvement in Africa as the reflection of a novelist tale and a credible testimony of incompetence of military assistance. While discrediting the utility of military assistance, the theorists forgot that it remained a core principle of state policy since Punic Wars.

Over a period of time, military assistance stands out to be unappealing or overlooked. Herodotus and Thucydides observed use of military assistance in the ancient Greece in colligation of political alliance to intimidate the enemy. Imperial Roman donor-recipient relationship of Julio-Claudian era witnessed the use of military assistance both in shape of grants to recipient kings and reinforcing recipient forces to match the Romans.

During the period of Renaissance merchants, the princes and the feudal lords had integrated in mercenary army to provide financial grants enabling them to contract muscles without waging a war.

The thinkers of post-Renaissance period who were exploring the extents of human conditions and political leaders dealing with donor-recipient relationship based on military assistance, didn't find it pleasing and relevant. But with the transformation in recording data scientifically like trade, capital flow, size and stockpiling armies, battle cause and effect, military budget got eminence unlike conventional data set, and it became conceivable to compute military assistance and the fall outs of foreign policy. Military assistance re-emerged in diplomacy and became part of appropriation bill during World War. Nevertheless, the theoretical grounds for policy decisions and analysis are shaky (Mott, 1999).

In the contemporary political theory, the concept of military assistance caught the eyes of theorists with the evolutionary process of US aid programs since World War II. Modern theories of military assistance underscore its use during peace times and pass over the ideas in warfare. Foreign aid encompasses both military and economic assistance, and theorists endeavor to

keep them conscientiously segregated. Jacob Kaplan associated it to “the absence of a compelling philosophy [for aid policy and] the lack of a rallying point in the form of either a set of tenets or a record of accomplishment (Kaplan, 1967).” The role of military assistance during war times has been overlooked by the theorist and scholars since they were more determined for preservation of world peace.

Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 1947-1955, was the reflection that the United States is realizing the need of preservation of peace and extending a helping hand to the war ridden area and building in new socio-economic and political mechanism; humanitarianism and relief from the destruction of war were the firm motivations of aid programs monopolized by economic aid. Korean war, Indochinese war, defeat of Chiang Kai-Shek and atomic program of the USSR exacerbated influence of communism and seemed eternal and worldwide. The United States confronted with strategic concerns and expanding communist influence in Europe rested her policy on two core propositions, containment of Communism and collective security. Military assistance made both the propositions feasible. It also popularized the principle of sharing the responsibility of joint defense, since states made their bases available for foreign nation and provided armed forces and political support in this regard (Council, 1992).

Marshall Plan provided theoretical foundation for linking economic aid to military and strategic policies. The US Mutual Defense Act of 1949 systemized economic and military assistance and transformed it from strategic policy employed during the wars to endless and calculated policy. Truman “Point Four” program of technical assistance put in the belief that economic growth in less developing countries (LDCs) could be nurtured through capital flow (Galdi, 1988) in the form of armament to contain Communism.

The next phase of theoretical development i.e., 1955–late 1960s witnessed a shift in the US policy towards alliances and cordiality in relations while competing with the USSR. Although the perils to security marginalized, a new trend in global politics was introduced in the form of elevated support to military assistance that substituted economic aid: European and Asian recouped from the sufferings of war and were in a position to handle the menace of Communism by themselves. The prevalent logic behind popularity of military aid was that both economic and military aid fall in the domain of foreign aid—an additive to the recipient nation to elevate their economic and security potential on their own without waging war (Council, 1992). The early theories of this era imitated the triumph of Marshall Plan, showing massive

## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

flow of money and goods given at right time, lead to economic growth and at the same time impede growth of Communism devoid of either military assistance (or) engagement of donor armed forces (Nowels, 1988).

Theoretical interest tilted towards politics as trend in Cold War shifted from military assistance to economic assistance, and the United States endorsed that poverty and dissatisfaction are the natural partners of Communism therefore aid should be provided not only military but economic and political as well. In 1960s, the United States used aid as a principal of its foreign policy encompassing both economic and military assistance. Consequently, the theorists found difficulty in segregating economic and military aid when it comes to US foreign aid appropriation bill.

The success of Communist forces in Vietnam disparaged the idea of military assistance of creating indigenous forces to fight traditional wars, and the assumption came to lime light justifying the role of military assistance in fighting insurrection and discrediting its role to foster economic growth. After the Vietnam war, the United States emphasized its internal security but still used military assistance in Sino-Soviet peninsula as a deterrent to encroachment and an early capability to fight against it (President, 1967). The aim was to create proxies as a component of US Forward Defense Strategy. The Nixon Doctrine (1969) brought the idea into effect again that military assistance can create a (Grimmett., 2009) surrogate force through “burden sharing.”

Before the Vietnam war, people were contented with the justification that military assistance is a means to prepare allies to handle local and regional threats without engaging the US forces directly. After the war, military assistance was regarded as a kind of force used by the United States that would always not be able to deter threats to their security with the hazard that US forces would be required to pledge (Hildreth, 1985).

The next phase of theoretical development—US defeat in Vietnam and détente—disregarded economic and military assistance as core principle of foreign policy. President Lyndon B. Johnson anti-poverty program considered poverty as the basic reason of instability and susceptibility to Communism (Hough, 1982). The US policy emphasized basic human needs while theorist focused on the behavioral facet of military assistance.

In mid 1970s, military assistance immensely diminished as the donor transformed military assistance recipient to buyers of weapons and officially


segregated military assistance from economic aid. Theorist focused their attention on transmission of armament either through donor aid or commercial deals, while military assistance touched its lowest point during Carter regime (1976-1980).

In the decade of 1980s, President Reagan introduced reforms and reinstated military assistance and economic aid as core principle of foreign policy and pronounced his arms sale policy as legitimate. However, the problem to differentiate between economic aid and military assistance came to surface in 1980s (Grimmett, 1988). Theorists realized the need of adhesive approach to manage both foreign and economic aid.

However, the event of 9/11 opened a new chapter of aid flow in the form of economic and military assistance. The United States sensed the need of providing military and economic assistance to materialize its stipulated objectives in Asia. In this regard, the revival of alliance between Pakistan and the United States is worth mentioning. To target its enemy, the United States gave new life to the ailing alliance with Pakistan. The United States extended economic and military aid through various funds as to enhance the potential of Pakistan in eliminating extremism and militancy from her soil (Markey, 2016).

### Us Security Assistance to Pakistan in Post 9/11 Period

To develop further understanding of this donor-recipient relationship and the US strategy to achieve its foreign policy objective, it is necessary to go through aid programs meant to seek Pakistan's support in post 9/11 period.



### *Security Assistance Funding Under Bureau of Political-Military Affairs*



## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

In the US, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs managed security assistance funds. This bureau provides security assistance through three funds: Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.

### *a) Foreign Military Financing (FMF)*

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is an account that provides security assistance for buying US defense equipment and services. FMF is a forum that set the stage for long-term Pak-US security relationship. Pakistan's position in the US security mechanism got elevated since the US found an increasing role of Pakistan in counterterrorism, enduring peace in Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation efforts (Iqbal, 2015). The fund aims to transform and modernize Pakistan's armed forces to enhance its potential through up-gradation of equipment, training of forces and acquisition of new equipment. It aims to promote closer ties between Pakistan and the United States and boost their interoperability.

Besides enhancing Pakistan's counter-insurgency and counterterrorism potentialities, FMF is developing Pakistan military potential to meet its defense requirements. FMF also aims to support the US strategy of promoting regional peace and stability, combating terrorism and increasing role of Pakistan in stability operations. By assisting Pakistan in meeting its security needs, the US justifies its role as a reliable partner in attaining mutual security interests (Shapiro, 2010). The evident expression of this support is Obama's proposal to the US Congress for six-time increase in FMF in his 2016 budget sent to the Congress. The budget shows increase in FMF to Pakistan from \$42.2 million in 2014-15 to \$265 million in 2016 (Iqbal, 2015). The proposed aid to Pakistan aims to reinforce Pakistan's military against the extremists, to enhance the security of Pakistan's nuclear installation and hasten its economic development. (Iqbal, 2015). These efforts of the US showed that the Obama administration, apart from realizing its objectives by taking advantage of Pakistan's geographical position, contemplated Pakistan an important player in bringing peace to the region. The Obama administration realized Pakistan as a major stakeholder in bringing peace in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, things suddenly changed for Pakistan as Donald Trump came into power.

The US State Department signaled to cut down volume of military aid to \$100 million for the coming fiscal year. Previously, Pakistan has received \$ 225 million in respect of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), but the Trump administration has proposed reduction of \$100 million. However, it is decided

to provide \$200 million as economic assistance to Pakistan as in the previous budget (Abbasi, 2017).

According to US State Department, the current budget emphasized an increase in the FMF for Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan. Apart from \$100 million as FMF, the budget for the year 2018 also proposed \$200 million as economic assistance while \$25 million for law enforcement agency. Additionally, the budget also suggested the approval of \$11.3 million for the reinforcement of health sector in Pakistan (Abbasi, 2017). Many officials, owing to the mounting frustration with Pakistan, agreed that there is need of ameliorating if not ending economic assistance to Pakistan. FMF in the previous five years averaged \$300 million (Markey, 2016).

Pakistan's ambassador to United States while talking about the \$125 million cut proposed in the budget asserted that both Pakistan and the United States have reciprocal interest in the counter-terrorism efforts. He further said that their bilateral relations cover diverse nature of issues encompassing counterterrorism, and this collaboration is serving the joint interest of both nations.

While justifying the Congressional budget, the US State Department underscored the significance of Pakistan and its crucial role in counterterrorism efforts, nuclear non-proliferation, restoration of peace in Afghanistan and economic integration in South and Central Asia. Pakistan is also serving as international business market for the US businesses.

The budget emphasized that FMF will promote the US national security interest in Pakistan by ensuring enhancement of stability and security and fighting terrorism by dismantling sanctuaries of militant organizations. It was emphasized that assistance to Pakistan helps in building counterterrorism and counterinsurgency competence of Pakistani security forces to install peace in the Tribal Belt along the borders of Afghanistan, achieve the mutually agreed objectives i.e., flushing out Al-Qaeda elements and repel the perils emanating from the ISIS.

According to the budget, the proposed \$200 million as Economic Support and Development Fund will ensure Pakistan's lasting security and border management and regional security structure (Abbasi, 2017).

**b) *International Military Education & Training (IMET)***

Pak-US military training program is another joint undertaking leading towards more cooperation. International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a platform that serves to strengthen Pak-US ties. This program is valuable for promoting expertise Pakistan's military leadership and building up its capacity to fight against the insurrectionaries in the future (Shapiro, 2010). Since 2009, about 1,120 members of Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force have been trained by the US. Additionally, both the states are leading joint training and military staff exchange each year to enhance cooperation and interoperability between militaries of the two states.

The Bush administration set out program of enhancing the potential of Frontier Corps (FC), the primary obligation of which is to protect the borders that Pakistan shares with Afghanistan. In 2007, the US started utilizing its funds for grooming and outfitting FC and compounding its engrossment in backing up Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. The United States has also been giving training to Pakistan's elite Special Service Group Command. All this lingered on during the Obama administration. However, the scheme of training the FC has been trammled by Pakistan's hesitancy of sending troops owing to its need for crucial operations to a different place. Some analysts are of the view that the US can better train Pakistani soldiers than private contractor.

Other security related programs for Pakistan include cooperation in counterinsurgency, border safety, infrastructure building, training to PAF for reconnaissance on extremists and to the army on increasing their competence and awareness on human rights and rule of law etc. (Kronstad, 2013).

The funds set aside for civilian security are meant to ameliorate and underpin law execution system, by providing police training and setting up of counterterrorism Special Investigation Group. The US efforts are shackled by Pakistan's inadequacies that contain corruption, underpay and meager training to the personnel etc. Some of the experts associate these inadequacies with democracy in broader sense and call for the US and global emphasis on enhancing Pakistan civilian sanctuary (Susan & Kronstad, 2013).

**c) *Pakistan's Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)***

To channelize security assistance to Pakistan and to enhance level of mutual understanding, the US shaped Pakistan's Counterinsurgency

Capability Fund (PCCF).<sup>1</sup> This category has been established with the objectives parallel to CSF but the only alteration is that funds are appropriated for training and reinforcing Pakistani forces to effectively fight against insurrectionaries in Pakistan (Tyson, 2009). Through this fund, the US provided assistance to Pakistan for developing and preserving the potential of its armed forces to launch counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and to destroy the terrorist safe heavens in FATA and elsewhere in Pakistan. However, owing to issues of implementation of the fund, Obama's administration decided to rescind and exclude it from the 2014-budget (Dawn, 2013). Pakistan was disappointed with the decision, since the US had revoked the fund without achieving the desired objectives completely. The issue could be solved through supervision and accountability, but the US preferred to annul the fund which would definitely be a setback to the joint efforts of eliminating militancy and bringing peace to the region.

Apart from that, the US humanitarian assistance is also a distinguished accomplishment for Pakistan. The US had set up developmental plan for FATA for ameliorating health and education facilities, particularly the US is providing aid to facilitate the people of war affected zone (USAID Fact Sheets). The military operations launched against the militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan forced the inhabitants to migrate to other areas of the country which put further pressure on the government to provide basic facilities to the temporarily displaced people. On a similar occasion, when the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, visited Pakistan in January 2015 to attend Strategic Dialogues between Pakistan and the US, both the states emphasized the long-term cooperation between them and affirmed to collaborate on the following areas of ongoing activities.

### ***Support for Temporarily Displaced Persons from FATA***

During his visit to Pakistan, the US Secretary John Kerry reiterated to support Pakistan's endeavors to fulfill the needs of 700,000 temporarily displaced persons (TDPs) and declared that the US will give \$250 million as aid for food, health, sustenance, livestock and maintenances (US Department

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<sup>1</sup> Appearing before both Senate and House panels in May 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates urged Congress to quickly provide significant new counterinsurgency funding for Pakistan, arguing that the newly authorized PCF/PCCF should be overseen by U.S. military commanders rather than by State Department civilians. Yet many in Congress voiced doubts about the wisdom of creating a major new stream of military funding under Pentagon oversight, as such aid traditionally has been subject to Foreign Assistance Act restrictions. When the House Appropriations Committee took up the issue, its members determined to place PCCF oversight in the hands of the State Department after FY2010, a plan then endorsed by the full House ("Gates Pushes Congress to Boost Pakistan Aid." *Washington Post*, May 1, 2009.

## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

of State, 2015). The US also vowed to support Pakistan in rebuilding of war ridden areas of Pakistan.

### ***Defense & Counterterrorism Cooperation***

The US and Pakistan enjoy compact security relationship. The US has also pledged to support Pakistan in case of malevolent threat to her internal security. It has also ensured its support in penalizing the offenders of December 16 episode. The Operation Zarb-e-Azb is a critical move to dismantle the sanctuaries of the terrorists in FATA. Under the security set up, the (Abbas, 2005) United States gives significant hardware to Pakistani troops for carrying out operation against the militants along Pak-Afghan border and to enhance Pakistan's role in global maritime security operation. The US support to Pakistan seems to be helpful in brushing aside the terrorists successfully. The US is likewise helping Pakistan in annihilating terrorism of all kind including those posing peril to regional security like Al-Qaeda, TTP, Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (US Department of State, 2015).

### ***US Security Assistance to Pakistan for Operational & Logistic Support***

Besides the security assistance provided through the above-mentioned funds, the US is also providing security assistance to Pakistan in acquiring modern weapons and equipment for increase its defense capabilities. The United States is also assisting Pakistan for launching operation in different parts of Pakistan, particularly in Pak-Afghan border areas. The US also has established Coalition Support Fund to reimburse money for the losses incurred by Pakistan during its fight against the militants.

### ***Coalition Support Fund (CSF)***

Pakistan and the United States are strategic partners in War on Terror and the US is extending its support to Pakistan in counterterrorism operations to destroy the militant's safe heavens, increase border security and realize the intent of Operation Enduring Freedom by means of Coalition Support Fund. Money is disbursed to Pakistan through this fund for the cost incurred in fighting terrorism (US Department of State, 2015). Since 2001, half of the financial transfer from CSF was made to Pakistan and nearly \$ 10.7 billion was disbursed till June 2013. Out of \$ 10.7 billion, only 2% was allocated to Pakistan Navy and Air Force while the remaining reimbursements are for Pakistan army (US Department of State, 2015). According to the Defense Department, money from CSF was used for 1,00,000 troops fighting in North Waziristan of Pakistan for their food, clothing, housing and armament (Kronstad, 2013).

During Bush administration, the Congress in FY2002 set aside millions of dollars to pay Pakistan and other countries helping the US in counterterrorist activities. In the later years, the Congress comprehended that standard accounting processes were not followed by the US Treasury in reimbursement to Pakistan. According to the sources of the State Department, Pakistan's request for CSF is intensely scrutinized by executive branch agencies, approved by the Secretary of Defense and can be withheld by Congressional action. But most of the funds have been misused by negligence owing to the lack of oversight. In 2008, the Bush administration also determined that Pakistan is diverting most of the funds towards consolidation of its military might against India (Walsh 2008).

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was given the job to supervise the issue of reimbursement made to Pakistan from CSF. The 2008 reports of GAO illustrated that only few of Pakistani demands were rejected or delayed till 2007. However, the number of rejected requests was greater in 2007 than the previous years. The GAO determined that supervision and accountability was desirable over Pakistan's compensation entitlements for CSF (GAO Report, 2008).

The aid program to Pakistan is said to be prudently scrutinized and recompensed. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2008 (Susan & Kronstad, 2013) demanded design of Coalition Support reimbursement from the Secretary of Defense. In 2010, Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador asserted 60-65% of Pakistan's requests under CSF are realized, though an official document depicts that \$688 million remunerated in December 2012 signify 68% of total claimed by Pakistan (Susan & Kronstad, 2013).

During Obama's regime, it was initially decided to annul this fund by the end of 2014. However, Obama later signed a bill into law on 14<sup>th</sup> December 2014 to extend CSF for another year. But this extension was made with certain strings attached to it (Web, 2014). The assistance provided to Pakistan under CSF will not outstrip \$1 billion. The US Defense Secretary has to certify to the Congress that the funds were used for military operations in North Waziristan for the obliteration of Haqqani Network (The Nation, 2014). The Defense Secretary was also stripped off his authority to sanction \$300 million to Pakistan. Now for the release of such funds, prior Congressional approval was made mandatory (The Express Tribune, 2014). Moreover, it was decided to assess Pakistan's actions taken against other militant groups like TTP, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Quetta Shur Taliban (The Nation, 2014). Being

## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

frustrated with Pakistan's efforts in War on Terror, the US indemnified more than \$13 billion in CSF, released \$9 billion in economic assistance from 2002 to 2014 (Markey D. , 2016).

Things became more difficult for Pakistan when Donald Trump came to power. In July 2017, the US Defense Department withheld \$50 million CSF payment after Pentagon Chief Jim Mattis leveled charges of not taking stern action against Haqqani Network. The US Defense Department spokesperson asserted "Secretary Mattis told the Congress Defense Committees that he was not able to certify that Pakistan took sufficient actions against the Haqqani Network to permit full reimbursement of the fiscal year 2016 Coalition Support Funds". The US appropriated \$900 million out of which Pakistan received \$550 million, but Jim Mattis withheld \$50. The remaining \$300 million were repealed by Congress in respect of broader appropriation act.

Adam Stump further told "This decision does not reduce the significance of the sacrifices that the Pakistani military has undertaken over previous years. Pakistan still has time to take action against the Haqqani Network in order to influence the secretary's certification decision in FY17 (AFP, 2017)."

The decisions taken by the US State Defense to withhold military funds reflects the level of the US seriousness in eliminating militancy from Pakistan and its efforts of bringing peace in Afghanistan and the region as well. CSF is a fund that was established for the purpose to bear the mutually agreed cost of losses incurred for fighting militancy, but the strings attached to it turned the effectiveness of the fund down.

### *Defense Provisions*

Since 2001, most of the armaments sales and aid to Pakistan incorporates the items that are valuable for counterinsurgency activities. From FY2002-FY2011, the amount under Foreign Military Sales agreement totaled \$5.2 billion (Grimmett, 2009). During operation in South Waziristan in late 2009, the US provided transport helicopters, parts of helicopters gunship, infantry equipment and intelligence and surveillance videos. In projected counterinsurgency operations, Pakistan obtained 1000 quarter-ton bombs and up to 1000 kits for making explosive bombs (Susan & Kronstad, 2013). The State Department argued that FMF are to be utilized only for counterterrorist activities.<sup>2</sup> Despite security assistance, criticism surfaced on Pakistan's

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<sup>2</sup> F-16 aircraft are reported by some to be effective in Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts, with improved training and enhanced capabilities allowing for more precise

diversion of all the assistance in beefing up its army against India and for paying less consideration to the elimination of terrorism (Grimmett, 2009).

The US officials are concerned that Pakistan has changed the US weapons in a manner that abuses Arm Export Control Act (Schmitt & Sanger, 2009). The accusation was levelled by the US intelligence agencies after Pakistan conducted the missile test on April 23, 2009. The US suspected that the said missile was a modified form of Harpoon missile provided to Pakistan during 1980s (The News, 2009). However, Pakistan strongly snubbed all these allegations. Pakistani officials claimed that Pakistan had indigenously developed this missile. The missile was actually a modified version of North Korea's technology to develop a land-based missile with the potential to strike India. Pakistani officials complained that defense equipment from the US is coming at very slow pace which obstructed military operations (Schmitt & Sanger, 2009). The US, on the other hand, replied that it had provided Pakistan 50 helicopters since 2006 to date; out of them, 12 are Cobra model. The delivery of some attacking helicopters was overdue owing to Pakistan's deferment (Lake, 2010).

However, *Wall Street Journal* on February 10, 2016, reported that Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Sen. Bob Corker, decided to stop Obama Administration from selling eight F-16 fighting jets to Pakistan. Coker in a letter to John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, termed Pak-US relations "complicated and imperfect"; regardless of the fact that their partnership realized some of the agreed objective. Pakistan stands out to be "a duplicitous partner, moving sideways rather than forward in resolving regional challenges (Markey, 2016)."

The accusations raised by the two cohorts shows the level of trust they have on each other. It is because of these accusations that efforts made by them to eliminate militancy lack sync. Resultantly, it provides opportunity to the militants to reorganize their efforts. Though, they are fighting for the same cause, but lack of trust leads to the ineffectiveness of their efforts. This is the reason why after a decade long war, they are unable to knock off militants completely.

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targeting resulting in fewer civilian casualties (see the December 17, 2009, statements of a Pentagon official at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4528>)



### *Conclusion*

In contemporary politics, foreign assistance is considered to be the most essential component of a foreign policy. Regional and international powers provide aid to the strategically significant states to get their support for strategic and security interests. Strategic and security assistance has been an important ingredient of the US foreign policy, not only in the Cold War but also in the post 9/11 period. However, the US government in the face of opposition from its public and the parliament have been consistently upgrading their security assistance to countries like Pakistan, which has important strategic significance for it. The post-2001 Bush Administration established different funds and started different programmes to promote the foreign policy objectives in the strategic and security realms. The 9/11 development elevated Pakistan's failing geo-strategic interest in the eyes of the US government and resultantly earned it a massive injection of security and military aid to fight the militants and support the US strategic design in the region. This paper argued that a large amount of aid inflow to Pakistan in post 9/11 period comes through the CSF, which is viewed as a compensation to Pakistan for the costs incurred and recompense for facilitating coalition forces in fighting the war against militancy and terrorism in the region. It is also important to note that after the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan (end of 2014), the US decided to rescind the fund (CSF), but was extended to another year by the Obama Administration with newer strings attached to it.

The findings of the paper also suggest that Trump Administration's coming into power brought the trust deficit between the two countries to a new height as President Donald Trump in his first tweet in 2018 admonished Pakistan of 'lies and deceit' and blamed her for providing safe heavens that sabotaged the US efforts for peace in Afghanistan. The attitude of the Trump administration highlighted the loopholes of the previous administration in its Afghan and South Asian strategy and cast strong and long-term doubts over Pakistan's credibility as the US ally in its War against terrorism. Trump exacerbated the distrust between the two states by further suspending \$900 million security assistance to Pakistan and terminating Coalition Support Fund (CSF) and suspended International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. This was supposed to serve as a stern action against Pakistan's alleged betrayal of trust. On Pakistan's side, the casualties and disproportionate suffering of human life with 60,000 lives lost and countless injured and a further economic collapse to the tune of \$ 126 billion in its siding of the WoT were highlighted by the government to play down US allegations of 'deceit' and 'lies'. Although security concerns remained a

significant component of the US foreign policy, however it can be argued from a realist perspective that Trump doesn't see the flow of aid to Pakistan in achieving the US foreign policy objective, especially in its security domain. Therefore, despite the repeated calls to Pakistan to 'do more' by previous administrations and the general perceptions by the US administration that Pakistan is not succeeding in fulfilling US foreign policy objectives, it never completely abandoned all security assistance to Pakistan though it did suspend certain heads of aid flows to Pakistan. This underlies the fact that Pakistan still carries weight in the US foreign policy as a potential ally to disarm militant groups and neutralize them in the region and initiate a long-term peace for Afghanistan by securing the Taliban support for the broad based and inclusive government in Afghanistan.

Pakistani perspective on its partnership with the US in post 9/11 period is that the assistance provided to it from different funds under different programs was intended to strengthen the armed forces of the country which, in turn, hampered the strength of the civilian institutions and, therefore, became a cause of derailing democratic process. This runs counter to the promotion of democracy as a fundamental US foreign policy objective. Another perspective also highlights that though military and strategic assistance has been increased multifold yet the civilian aspect of rehabilitation and reintegration of the ones affected most from anti-terrorism operations has been scantily paid attention to. The US has neither initiated any programme for the reconstruction of areas damaged or destroyed because of the military operations launched to destroy the sanctuaries of the militants, nor it has significantly contributed to reintegration in post operation period. Although, in the recently held Pak-US Strategic Dialogues, the US pledged to provide aid for such areas, but no specific program has so far been offered for a practical implementation of its pledges into plan of action. With the recent shifts in US aid policy towards Pakistan coupled with the long-term ramifications associated with security assistance programs, it is highly inevitable that such relationship between the two countries needs to be studied and researched from new perspectives for drawing with sharper observations and generalizations for the future of Pakistan US relationship in the region.

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## US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

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